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aggravator in Virginia officially or not, references to future dangerous-
ness will be similarly difficult to keep out ofa case. Arguably, the factor
is always a concern of jurors. Second, parole ineligibility is in fact a
mitigating factor. 14 Precluding mitigation evidence is of course consti-
14 For additional discussion of the Supreme Court of Virginia's
treatment of Simmons issues, see case summaries, Joseph v. Common-
wealth, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No.2, p. 2 3 (1995); Cardwell v.
Commonwealth, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 25 (1995);
Wilson v. Commonwealth, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 2 7
tutionally impermissible regardless of the aggravating factors relied
upon by the Commonwealth.
15
Summary and analysis by:
Jeanne-Marie S. Raymond
(1995); and Ramdass v. Commonwealth and Wright v. Commonwealth,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 31 (1995)
15 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104 (1982).
ROYAL V. COMMONWEALTH
250 Va. 110, 458 S.E.2d 575 (1995)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On February 21, 1994, Thomas Lee Royal met with three accom-
plices near a shopping center. Royal handed each accomplice a gun, and
they proceeded across the center. They intended to kill Officer Curtis
Cooper. Instead of finding him, however, they encountered Officer
Kenneth E. Wallace, sitting in his patrol car. Royal fired two shots at
Wallace from a .38 caliber handgun.1
Royal was indicted for the capital murder of a police officer and the
use of a firearm to commit the murder. He entered guilty pleas to both
charges.2 The pleas were taken based on a stipulation of the facts.
At the penalty phase, the Commonwealth's evidence included the
testimony of the probation officer who prepared the pre-sentence report,
an investigating officer, and the intended victim. The Commonwealth
also put on Dr. Ryans, a forensic psychiatrist, who explained that Royal
had an anti-social personality and that he could not definitely conclude
that Royal would not be a future danger to society.
3
Based upon a finding of future dangerousness, the trial judge
sentenced Royal to death.4 Royal appealed his death sentence, challeng-
ing the judge's finding of future dangerousness and arguing thatthejudge
succumbed to community pressure in imposing the death penalty.
5
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the convictions and death
sentence, finding that the trial judge, who also had acted as sentencer,
properly applied the future dangerousness factor and that the record did
not support Royal's claim that public pressure had led to his sentence.
6
I Royal v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 110, 112-13,458 S.E.2d 575,
576 (1995).
21d. at 112, 458 S.E.2d at 576.
3 Id. at 113-14,458 S.E.2d at 576-77.
4 1d. at 115,458 S.E.2d at 577.
5 Id. at 115, 119,458 S.E.2d at 577, 579.
6 The court rejected all of defendant's assignments of error. Some
of the rulings provide little if any guidance because they apply broad,
settled principles of law to facts that are specific to the case being
reviewed. Issues that will not be addressed in this summary include: (1)
limitation of evidence to past criminal record in determining future
dangerousness; (2) failure to limit evidence relating to the killing to that
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Erroneous Capital Murder Charge
The primary difficulty with the Supreme Court of Virginia's opin-
ion goes to an issue apparently not raised on appeal: based on the
stipulation as recited by the court, Royal did not commit capital murder.
The Code provision reads that the killing ofa law officer is capital murder
only when "such killing is for the purpose of interfering with the
performance of his official duties."7 But, according to the stipulation,
although Officer Wallace was sitting in his patrol car, Royal did not kill
him to prevent him from carrying out police activities. Rather, the
stipulated facts state that Royal killed Wallace simply because Wallace
had the misfortune of being where the defendant thought he would find
the intended victim.
8
Virginia Code section 18.2-31(6) requires a purposeful interfer-
ence on the part of the culprit. It is similar to section 18.2-31(9) which
requires that the killing take place in order to further the commission or
attempted commission of a drug transaction. 9 Moreover, because this
claim goes to the court's jurisdiction to try the defendant in the first place,
it is not a claim which is to be viewed as subject to default.10 The court
had no power to try him under section 18.2-31(6).
Counsel should remember that a close reading of section 18.2-31
often reveals that the Commonwealth cannot charge capital murder.
Although Virginia death penalty law is in many ways unfavorable to the
defendant, its capital murder statute has narrow requirements that some-
times are overlooked by defense counsel. The first step, therefore, should
always be to carefully review the facts under the statute and file a motion
to dismiss the indictment if the facts cannot support a capital murder
charge.
stipulated in the guilt phase; (3) failure to establish a prima facie case of
future dangerousness.
7 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (6).
8 250 Va. at 113,458 S.E.2d at 576. The Supreme Court of Virginia
does not make clear why Royal wanted to kill Cooper. But itis clear from
the stipulated facts that he did not kill Wallace for the purpose of
interfering with police activities.
9 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2.31 (9). (emphasis added).
10 For a discussion of procedural default, see Groot, To Attain The
Ends of Justice: Confronting Virginia's Default Rules in Capital Cases,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol.6, No.2, p. 44 (1994).
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11. Burden of proof for future dangerousness
In his assignments of error, Royal asserted that during the penalty
phase, the court erroneously shifted the burden of persuasion to him to
"disprove that he was a future danger."11 The prosecution had put on Dr.
Ryans who testified that he was unable to state with medical certainty that
Royal would not repeat "violent behavior that put others at risk." 12 Royal
moved to strike this evidence on the ground that it was "equivocal."
13
The trial judge, who was also acting as sentencer, denied the motion and
commented to this effect: had Dr. Ryans stated there was a reasonable
degree of certainty that Royal would not repeat the behavior, "I would
have listened to [him].
'14
Royal argued that the judge's statement implied that the defendant
had the burden to disprove whatever evidence the Commonwealth put on
as to future dangerousness. 15 The Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed
Royal's argument, stating that, taken in context, the judge's comment did
not function to require affirmative expert testimony that Royal did not
constitute a continuous threat to society. Instead, it went to the weight
that the sentencer could give to Dr. Ryans' testimony. 16 As the Supreme
Court of Virginia saw it, the trial court's comment concerned only the
significance of the Commonwealth's evidence and was not intended to
say to the defendant, "If the prosecution has 'evidenced' future danger-
ousness, you must disprove it.' ' 17 Nonetheless, while rejecting the
defendant's argument, the Virginia Supreme Court also reaffirmed that
the burden of persuasion as to future dangerousness remains upon the
Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
11Royal, 250 Va. at 117-18,458 S.E.2d at 579.







Royal also assigned as error the trial judge's refusal to recuse
himself. He contended that there was substantial publicity surrounding
the case and that there was significant public pressure on the judge to
impose the death penalty.18 In rejecting this argument, the Supreme
Court of Virginia stated: "The record is devoid of any indication that the
trial court's sentencing decision was affected by public pressure or
publicity." 19 The court also declared that public notoriety alone is not
enough to vacate a death sentence.20 The court's opinion is a reminder
that counsel must be careful to create a record which evidences that the
court's decision was affected by community pressures. Such a record
should include comments made by the prosecution and the judge that
appear to reflect public opinion, as well as any other evidence available
to document the community atmosphere surrounding the trial.
IV. Vileness Removed
Finally, counsel should note that although Royal fired two shots into
Wallace, the trial judge granted Royal's motion at the penalty phase to
strike the Commonwealth's evidence relating to vileness as a statutory
predicate.2 1 The success of Royal's motion stresses the need to make
such motions in attacking the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's
evidence and makes clear that multiple shots by themselves do not
constitute vileness.
Summary and analysis by:
Mary E. Eade
18 1d.
19 Id. at 119, 458 S.E.2d at 579-80.
20 Id. at 119, 458 S.E.2d at 579, (citing Beaver v. Commonwealth,
232 Va. 521, 536, 352 S.E.2d 342, 350, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033
(1987)).
21 Id. at 114,458 S.E.2d at 577.
FITZGERALD v. COMMONWEALTH
249 Va. 299, 455 S.E.2d 506 (1995)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Ronald Lee Fitzgerald was convicted of robbery and capital murder
of Coy M. White and rape and capital murder of Claudia Denise White. 1
During the sentencing phase, Fitzgerald requested a jury instruction
based on Simmons v. South Carolina.2 The proposed instruction would
have informed the jury that under Virginia law, a person found guilty of
three separate felony offenses of murder, rape, or robbery by presenting
a firearm or other deadly weapon, or any combination of those offenses
which were not part of a common act, transaction, or scheme, is not
eligible for parole.3 The trial judge denied this instruction.4
I Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 299,301,455 S.E.2d 506,
507 (1995).
2 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
3 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(B11) (1994).
4 Fitzgerald, 249 Va. at 305, 455 S.E.2d at 510.
In the first stage of a bifurcated trial, the jury convicted Fitzgerald
of all the charged crimes.5 In the penalty stage, the jury fixed Fitzgerald's
sentence at death for the first count of capital murder based on the future
dangerousness predicate, and death for the second count of capital
murder based on the vileness and/or future dangerousness predicates. 6
HOLDING
Under Virginia Code sections 17.110.1(A) and 17-110.1(F), the
Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated the automatic review of
Fitzgerald's death sentence with his other appeals.7 The court then
upheld the convictions and death sentence.
8
5 Id. at 301,455 S.E.2d at 507.
61d. at 301,455 S.E.2d at 508.
7 Id. at 301-02, 455 S.E.2d at 508.
8 1d. at 310, 455 S.E.2d at 512.
